politics | Egypt Update: The Army tries to control the revolution, revolutionaries NOT pleased.

Protesters return to Egypt's Tahrir square

Portrait of a Revolutionary Hossam El- Hamalawy on the Role of the Egyptian Army Part 2

Jadaliyya is hereby presenting the first installment in a interactive (see below) series called "A Portrait of a Revolutionary," featuring interviews with an Egyptian journalist and activist who was at the forefront of the Egyptian protest movement. Hossam's vantage point is quite unique, and his broad knowledge of the Egyptian political landscape as well as history positions him to provide an unparalleled account of the the context and developments that have led to the resignation of former Egyptian President, Husni Mubarak, and the aftermath.

Below is the second part of the interview. I opted for presenting it first, however, because it is in English (the first part is to be posted soon. Among other issues, it deals with the role of the Egyptian Labor Unions in tipping the scale during the last days before Mubrak's resignation. It is in Arabic).

This interview deals with the role of the army (then and now) in a quite candid and courageous manner that demystifies the halo that was created around that institution. The details that are brought to bear in the interview, and he analytical context in which they are lodged, are quite valuable for any observer/researcher.MORE

The Egyptian Elite and the Egyptian Revolt Part 3

Jadaliyya is hereby presenting the third installment in a interactive (see below) series called "A Portrait of a Revolutionary," featuring interviews with an Egyptian journalist and activist who was at the forefront of the Egyptian protest movement. Hossam's vantage point is quite unique, and his broad knowledge of the Egyptian political landscape as well as history positions him to provide an unparalleled account of the the context and developments that have led to the resignation of former Egyptian President, Husni Mubarak, and the aftermath.
Below is the third part of the interview. The second part addresses the role of the army and can be viewed here. The first part is not posted yet, but it deals with the role of the Egyptian Labor Unions in tipping the scale during the last days before Mubrak's resignation. It is in Arabic.
This third part addresses the role of the political and, mainly, the economic elite during and after the revolt, with emphasis on where they stand now and what their strategies are for getting back into the political arena. Hossam provides a vivid account that is certainly missing from mainstream accounts, even those in the region, including Al-Jazeera (oooh).

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(part one is coming shortly)

Blueprint for the future

Charting the course for the next several months, the ruling military has just issued an elaborate constitutional declaration but not all are content. Gamal Essam El-Din reports

Eleven days after a referendum in which 77.2 per cent of voters said "yes" to a number of constitutional amendments, the Higher Council of the Armed Forces (HCAF) yesterday issued an interim constitutional declaration aimed at drawing up a political map of Egypt until a new parliament and a new head of state are elected.

But the declaration, announced in a press conference by Gen Mamdouh Shahin, the HCAF's legal adviser, immediately raised a number of questions. It included 62 articles, the most important being that half the seats in the People's Assembly -- parliament's lower house -- must be reserved for representatives of workers and farmers.

The declaration also espoused the 1971 constitution's widely debated Article 2, stating that Islam is the religion of the state and that the principles of Islamic Sharia (code of laws) are the main source of legislation in Egypt.

The declaration also stated that the powers of the Shura Council -- Egypt's upper house parliament -- will be reduced.

Shahin said that while parliamentary elections will be held in September, presidential elections will follow one or two months later.

In general, the constitutional declaration's 62 articles deal with four chapters regulating the performance of the state; basic rights and freedoms; the system of government; and the rule of law. The declaration espoused the constitutional amendments approved in the 19 March referendum, including limiting the presidency to two four-year terms and easing restrictions on candidates seeking to run in presidential campaigns.

They also state that elections must be held under full judicial supervision and compel the elected president to select a vice president within his first 60 days in officeMORE

The spring of the Egyptian revolution

THE NEXT few days and weeks in Egypt are certain to lead to a continuation of the social and class polarization that erupted after February 11.

On the one hand, the Supreme Council and the new Cabinet have escalated their anti-revolutionary rhetoric and measures. They are supported by large sections of the frightened middle classes and, of course, the wealthy.

For example, the Cabinet recently announced a draconian law that would criminalize certain protests and strikes in periods of emergency in the future. The army also attempted to use force to break up a 10-day sit-in by students in the school of mass communications at Cairo University to demand the dismissal of a corrupt dean.

Both the army and the cabinet can now rely on a new ally in their campaign for "stability" and "law and order": The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Fundamentalist Group.

The Muslim Brotherhood and the more reactionary fundamentalists campaigned in favor of passing the cosmetic constitutional changes proposed by the Supreme Council. These groups turned the referendum into a vote on the "Islamic" identity of the country. They told people that it was their religious duty to vote yes in order to prevent the establishment of a secular state with equal rights for the minority Christians.

Incredibly, in this effort, the Muslim Brotherhood formed a de facto bloc with their former jailors, Mubarak's NDP. The NDP is discredited, but has yet to be dismantled--and it was the only other political group in the country to support the army's proposals.

So the fundamentalists are attempting to polarize the country along religious line and weaken the unity between Muslims and Christians forged since January 25--something that can only benefit the old regime.

Meanwhile, remnants of the old secret police are attempting to wreak havoc in the country through an arson campaign directed at Interior Ministry buildings--in order to cover their past crimes--and through threats to assassinate public figures who support the revolution, such as Mohamed ElBaradei and Kefaya leader George Ishaq.

Nevertheless, during the middle of March, there were a number of positive developments on the side of those who support the revolution.MORE

Tahrir and Beyond: Ten Days That Shook My World

Revolution is not a matter of a few tumultuous weeks of crescendo battle at the barricades, nor is it the glorious day of victory (although “the date” is to always be treasured, celebrated, remembered and never denied). The period between January 25 and February 13 of 2011 was, rather, the long and often painful labor to give birth to a new Egypt. And while the old Pharaoh has fled the castle, his lackeys and functionaries still occupy so many of its recesses. To borrow from another famous myth of those lands, the vestiges of the Pharaoh – the regime itself, or The State – now seek to kill the revolution in its infancy. This is what always happens. Truth is, authentic revolution never ends. And what we met and learned from was a critical mass of Egyptians from all walks of life, emboldened and ready to defend it with their all.
In a rooftop apartment a half block from Tahrir Square, and in other locations, the Narco News team set up shop for a week. There, we received community organizers, strategists, bloggers, journalists, unaffiliated people who slept on Tahrir Square during those tumultuous events, doctors who cared for the wounded there, video makers who filmed them (and who designed the series of viral videos that helped bring an unexpected multitude to Tahrir on January 25). On camera, we interviewed Muslims, Coptic Christians, atheists, secularists, leftists of every indole, liberals, and rank-and-file participants of diverse hue.
We asked every one of them a series of twelve questions, which began with this statement:
“We are conducting interviews with people who were involved and direct eyewitnesses to the resistance of January and February 2011 in Egypt that brought the fall of Mubarak. Our questions are about your own personal experience: what you personally saw, what you did, how you did it, the tactics, strategies and decisions you made, and how these events affected your daily life. Unlike many journalist interviews, we are not asking people to analyze ‘what other people did or saw.’ We ask you for your own lived experience, so that people in Mexico and everywhere else around the world who want to do the same things in their lands can see how it was done here. Your personal experience is important to them and to us so we can learn from it. So, please, we request that you answer the questions by telling of what you saw, heard and did during these historic events. Your story is very interesting to the world. And thank you for talking with us and our viewers in many languages!”
The questions ranged from how each individual spent the days leading up to January 25, what they did and experienced on that date, and then on other key dates of the resistance struggle. We asked about the tactical and strategic decisions that had to be made, how they were made, and why specific paths were chosen. We asked whether the January 27 shut down of the Internet hurt or helped the resistance (the answer was unanimous from each and every person, and the consensus may surprise the techno-evangelists who speak so carelessly of “Twitter Revolutions”). We also asked deeply personal questions about whether participating in “the revolution” changed how they see themselves, their life plans, and their relations with family, love, creed and State. The interviews went on and on (the shortest lasted 45 minutes) particularly because most people had so much to say.
One of our Arabic translators and collaborators, a Muslim woman, who had in recent months worked as a “fixer” (interpreter and guide) for other reporters, including from the New York Times and the Washington Post, told us: “We’ve never been asked these questions. The guys from the Times and the Post kept saying‘we want to interview the leaders of the revolution.’ I told them, ‘We have no leaders.’ They said, ‘Try harder’!”

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How a revolution succeeds

However, Egypt simultaneously needs to be prepared to sustain the consequences of radical change. Political, social and economic revolutions are akin to major surgical intervention; they cut and slice and leave ugly scars that only really fade when revolutions succeed in becoming part of a noble history of change and reform. Perhaps the greatest hurdle we need to overcome in this regard is the task of creating a broad consensus over what exactly needs to be done. This involves more than agreeing on such general aims as uprooting corruption and realising democracy; it also entails developing the model of society we want to strive towards. Before the revolution, the Turkish and Malaysian systems were frequently cited as possible models to emulate. Why not subject them to closer analysis and put them to the political forces and the general public for discussion?

Finally, in order to move beyond inspiring demonstrations in Tahrir Square and to attain its ends, the revolution must come to terms with the conundrum of government bureaucracy, for this will ultimately make or break the revolution. Perhaps one of the worst features of the Egyptian experience over the past six decades was the cancerous growth of government. At the time of the 1952 Revolution, there were 350,000 civil servants. Within a decade, the figure doubled to 770,312 and by the time Abdel-Nasser died they had become 1,290,538. Over the next decade, there were 2,474,459 people on the government payroll and they continued to multiply exponentially until they exceeded five million as we entered the third millennium. If we add to these public and security sector employees the figure tops 6.5 million, or nearly a third of the Egyptian labour force. They form the largest political party, the largest economic contingent and, with a per capita production as valued in dollars equivalent to a third of their Chinese counterparts, the least productive bureaucracy in the Third World.
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All the king’s men: Who runs Mubaraks' money?

On 28 February 2011 the Egyptian daily Al-Ahram published a list of bank accounts allegedly belonging to Gamal Mubarak (younger son of ousted President Hosni Mubarak) and that the Prosecutor General received a report that Gamal deposited significant amounts into these accounts, which were not yet traceable.

The recent revolution in Egypt, whose people have risen up against corruption, among many things, prompted the Prosecutor General's decision to freeze all Mubarak family bank accounts, including those of Gamal Mubarak.

In comparison to the media’s reports of the fortune that the Mubaraks accumulated the actual case against the Mubaraks is over trivial sums of money. The full network of assets, funds, shares and accounts will be no doubt tricky to assess, making it an unenviable task.

A search of all the Mubarak family-linked investment funds on the web always leads to a singular end: No information available.

Ahram Online’s investigation, however, has unearthed a few key names and inevitabley leads to the largest investment bank in Egypt: EFG-Hermes.

It all started when Gamal Mubarak left Egypt for London in the late 1980s to work at the Bank of America.MORE